DNS Abuse Mitigation

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ICANN76 14 March 2023



Agenda

- 1. Introduction and overview by GAC Topic Leads
- 2. Presentation by Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network
- **3.** Presentation on Cybercrime Statistics
- 4. Ongoing Activities in the ICANN Community
- 5. Considerations for Cancún Communiqué

DNS Abuse Mitigation: Importance

Why this is important for the GAC

- Existing definitions of Abuse of the DNS include Security Threats such as *Phishing, Malware, Botnets* (GAC <u>Beijing Safeguard Advice</u>) and as "*intentionally deceptive, conniving, or unsolicited activities that actively make use of the DNS and/or the procedures used to register domain names*" (CCT Review definition quoted in the GAC Statement on DNS Abuse, 18 September 2019) constitute:
 - A threat to consumers and Internet users (individual and commercial) and their trust in the DNS
 - $\circ~$ A threat to the security, stability and resiliency of DNS Infrastructure
- The GAC established a Public Safety Working Group (PSWG) in the <u>ICANN52 Singapore Communiqué</u> (11 February 2015)
 - to focus aspects of ICANN's policies and procedures that implicate the safety of the Public (see TOR)
 - As part of its strategic objectives, as reflected in its 2023-2024 Work Plan, the PSWG seeks to:
 Support and develop capabilities of the ICANN and Law Enforcement communities to prevent and mitigate abuse involving the DNS as a key resource
- The GAC, the GAC Public Safety Working Group and many ICANN stakeholder groups prioritize curbing DNS Abuse, recognizing in particular that current ICANN contracts do not provide sufficiently clear and enforceable obligations to mitigate DNS Abuse and need to be improved. This is has been evidenced in:
 - Community discussions
 - Board correspondence (in particular <u>with the Business Constituency in 2020/2019</u>, see 12 Feb. 2020)
 - GAC Inputs in Reviews (CCT, RDS-WHOIS2, SSR2) and in GNSO PDPs (New gTLD Subsequent Procedures)
 - $\circ~$ Ongoing Contract Negotiations between ICANN org and Contracted Parties

Presentation by Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network (30 min)

Presentation on Cybercrime Trends from 2022


Without the understanding of multiple perspectives, you can never fully understand the impact or level of threat from Cybercrime.

DNS centric Reporting:


- DNS Abuse Institute (<u>Compass</u>)
- ICANN Domain Abuse Activity Reporting (<u>DAAR</u>)
- European Commission
 <u>Study on Domain Name System (DNS) abuse</u>
- Interisle Phishing and Malware Reports

Perspectives from PSWG Members:

- FBI Internet Crime Report 2022
- UK Cybercrime Research and Analysis 2022




UK - Reporting Volume





UK - Breaches or attacks over time

Percentage of organisations surveyed over time identifying any breaches or attacks



UK - Business and Charities breaches





UK - Suspicious email reporting service (SERS)

The public are encouraged to forward suspect emails to the UK's Suspicious Email Reporting Service (SERS) at report@phishing.gov.uk, while suspicious texts should be forwarded to 7726.


SERS received 6.4 million reports during 2022. This brings the total number of reports since its launch in 2020 to 15.8m.

The top Government branded attacks that have been reported to SERS that have resulted in takedowns are:

- 1. National Health Service (NHS)
- 2. TV Licensing
- 3. HM Revenue & Customs
- 4. Gov.uk
- 5. Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency


Figure 4: Losses incurred by victims of fraud, TCSEW year ending March 2022


England and Wales



- Information received from Police report that a victims social media account had been hacked.
- The victim who was a 17 year old reported that the hacker was asking for more passwords.
- They reported loss of accounts including Snapchat, Instagram, TikTok and their Gmail account.
- Suspect identified
- History of hacking social media
- Warrant at home address finding active phones.
- Evidence on mobile phones of mass phishing.


The Suspect used the phones to send out hundreds of phishing messages to young girls. The accounts used were hacked accounts of other young girls.





- Action Fraud is the UK's national reporting centre for fraud and cyber crime.
- In 2020 2021 (most recent public report)
 - Action Fraud received 875,622 reports of fraud
 - leading to £2.35bn reported losses.
- 80% of reported fraud was cyber enabled.
- The report identified phishing emails as the key enabler for criminals to initiate cyber attacks and fraud

FBI Internet Crime Report for 2022



The Internet Crime Complaint Center (ic3.gov) is the primary intake portal for reporting Internet crimes to the FBI.

IC3 BY THE NUMBERS16



2,175+ Average complaints received daily



651,800+ Average complaints received per year (last 5 years)



Over 7.3 Million



INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER

Measured not by # of domains, but # of victims, \$




Top 5 Crime Types Compared, over past 5 Years

"DNS Abuse"

is not tracked as a category.

BUT...

There are categories of DNS Abuse which *are* tracked in IC3 reports:




Count of Complaints - by category of scheme

2022 CRIME TYPES

By Victim Count			_
Crime Type	Victims	Crime Type	Victims
Phishing	300,497	Government Impersonation	11,554
Personal Data Breach	58,859	Advanced Fee	11,264
Non-Payment/Non-Delivery	51,679	Other	9,966
Extortion	39,416	Overpayment	6,183
Tech Support	32,538	Lottery/Sweepstakes/Inheritance	5,650
Investment	30,529	Data Breach	2,795
Identity Theft	27,922	Crimes Against Children	2,587
Credit Card/Check Fraud	22,985	Ransomware	2,385
BEC	21,832	Threats of Violence	2,224
Spoofing	20,649	IPR/Copyright/Counterfeit	2,183
Confidence/Romance	19,021	SIM Swap	2,026
Employment	14,946	Malware	762
Harassment/Stalking	11,779	Botnet	568
Real Estate	11,727		


Descriptors*			
Cryptocurrency	31,310	Cryptocurrency Wallet	20,781

And the very newest trends...



Key Takeaway

- Phishing is DNS Abuse
- Phishing is top reported Internet crime
- Phishing enables many other crimes
- Swift action against
 Maliciously Registered
 Domains is key



Contracted Parties (ICANN76 Outreach on DNS Abuse)

- Registries are working on voluntary sharing of statistics relating to "evidenced and escalated" instances of DNS Abuse, as part of their obligation to monitor Security Threats (RA Specification 11 3b) Registry Operator will periodically conduct a technical analysis to assess whether domains in the TLD are being used to perpetrate security threats, such as pharming, phishing, malware, and botnets. Registry Operator will maintain statistical reports on the number of security threats identified and the actions taken as a result of the periodic security checks. [...]
- The Registrar Stakeholder Group developed <u>acidtool.com</u> (Abuse Contact IDentifier) to provide contact information of relevant parties to whom to direct **DNS Abuse reports**, including: hosting and email service providers, registrar and registrant.
- During ICANN76 the DNS Abuse Institute discussed with the PSWG the continued use of <u>netbeacon.org</u>, a free **centralized reporting tool** (for phishing, malware, botnets and spam) which standardizes and enriches reports and distributes them automatically to registrars (currently only for gTLDs). This was presented to the GAC during ICANN74 and is consistent with the recommendation in SSAC 115.
- The DNS Abuse Institute shared its continued measurement, and analysis of DNS Abuse data, measuring phishing and malware, including levels of mitigation, time to mitigation, and distribution between compromised and malicious domains.

GNSO Small Team on DNS Abuse


- On 31 January 2022 the GNSO Council <u>formed</u> a GNSO Small Team on DNS Abuse expected to determine "*what policy efforts, if any, the GNSO Council should consider undertaking* to support the efforts already underway in the different parts of the community to tackle DNS abuse".
- In the <u>The Hague Communiqué</u> (20 June 2022), the GAC stated that "any PDP on DNS Abuse should be narrowly tailored to produce a timely and workable outcome" to which the ICANN Board responded that it shares this view and is prepared to support the ICANN community in such pursuits.
- The GNSO Small Team recommended in a <u>Report to the GNSO Council</u> (7 October 2022): the initiation of a tightly scoped policy development on malicious registrations (Rec. 1), further exploration of the role of bulk registrations play in DNS Abuse and measures already in place to address it (Rec. 2), encouraging further work towards easier, better and actionable reporting of DNS Abuse (Rec. 3), and possible work between Contracted Parties and ICANN Compliance regarding its findings on potential gaps in interpretation and/or enforcement of the current ICANN contracts (Rec. 4)

ICANN Domain Abuse Activity Reporting (DAAR)

- The ICANN DAAR tool continues to analyse data related to 1145 gTLD's (and 21 <u>participating ccTLDs</u>) to produce reports on trends of reported abuse on domains from a number of sources.
- They continue to produce <u>monthly reports</u> available to the community and track trends.
- The GAC <u>welcomed</u> (21 Feb. 2022) the agreement between ICANN and the Registry Stakeholder Group (RySG) to expand data collection to enable registrar-level reporting in DAAR for gTLDs.
- In its <u>response</u> (29 March 2022), ICANN org stated that expanding DAAR's access to registrar-level data is a priority for ICANN org. A <u>proposed amendment</u> of the Registry Agreement to this effect (Sep. 2022) is undergoing a 60-day voting period for registries approval

ICANN's Contracting Model (Reminder)

- ICANN and Registrars contract via the Registrar Registration Agreement (RAA)
- ICANN and Registry Operators contract via the Registry Agreement (RA)
- ICANN is not a party to agreements between:
 - Registries and Registrars (Registry-Registrar Agreements)
 - Registrars and Resellers
 - Registrars/Resellers and Registrants



Ongoing Issues: Resellers (intermediaries between registrants and ICANN-accredited registrars)

- Phase 1 Proposed Implementation <u>GAC Comment on the Draft Registration Data</u> <u>Consensus Policy for gTLDs</u> (21 November 2022)
 - Re: "6.4 Registrar MAY generate the Reseller data element value. "... GAC suggests the following text:

6.4 Registrar SHOULD generate the Reseller data element value, for the Reseller with a direct relationship with the Registrant.

- GAC supports the inclusion of corporate entities inherent to the registrar's distribution channel as this would prove as a benefit in highlighting the best point of contact to deal with notifications of abuse or compromise to the party with the ability to act the quickest or most appropriately.
- This is consistent with Recommendation 17 of the <u>CCT Review Team</u> (8 Sep. 2018): ICANN should collect data about and publicize the chain of parties responsible for gTLD domain name registrations.
 - → ICANN Board "accepted" this recommendation and noted this was already being done but... this was an optional ,not mandatory collection and publication

Potential Issues for Communiqué (1/2)

- **Contract Negotiations** Contracted parties have signaled that their current negotiations:
 - Seek to raise the floor on contract obligations with regard to taking action against DNS Abuse
 - First of many steps (may include targeted PDPS, more negotiations)
 - Upcoming opportunity for public comments
 - GAC role in next steps

Potential Issues for Communiqué (2/2)

- **Resellers** Prior GAC Input regarding Identifying Resellers
 - GAC Comments on CCT Review Final Report (Dec. 2018)
 - GAC Comments on Plan for Implementation (Oct. 2019)
 - <u>GAC Comment on the Draft Registration Data Consensus Policy for gTLDs</u> (Nov. 2022)

Considerations for Cancun Communiqué

- Statement of Support for the Contract Negotiations
- Follow-up on prior GAC input on issues of resellers
- Are there any other topics GAC Members would like to see reflected in the Communiqué ?